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ARBITRATING ESTOPPEL: EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL IN ARBITRATION CONTRACTS
NICHOLAS OLESKI

∗

ABSTRACT
The Sixth Circuit and the district courts within the circuit have held that nonsignatories to arbitration contracts may be compelled to arbitrate under the Federal
Arbitration Act—even though they are not signatories to the arbitration contract.
These courts reason that the non-signatories must arbitrate their claims because of an
equitable estoppel theory. Although the Federal Arbitration Act displaces most state
law regarding arbitration, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts must use
state contract law to determine who is bound by an arbitration contract. This Note
examines state contract law in the Sixth Circuit on equitable estoppel and concludes
that the Sixth Circuit’s equitable estoppel theory is not based on state law.
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INTRODUCTION
The primary advantage of arbitration,1 or any form of alternative dispute
resolution, is that it allows willing parties to settle disputes without resorting to the
J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, May 2016. Special thanks to Professor
Sandra Kerber for her advice and guidance throughout law school. I would also like to thank
my parents for their love and support with this endeavor, and more.
∗

1

Defined as a “term for a range of dispute resolution processes involving the referral of a
dispute to an impartial third party who, after giving the parties an opportunity to present their
evidence and arguments renders a determination in settlement of the dispute.” Kevin A.
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courts. But imagine being subjected to arbitration by a party with whom you never
agreed to arbitrate. It would mean, in essence, involuntarily waiving your Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial;2 it would mean subjecting yourself to a closeted and
closed quasi-judicial practice with little chance of appeal, all of which tend to favor
business organizations—not the individual.3 Under an equitable estoppel theory
promulgated by several circuits4 and adopted by courts in the Sixth Circuit,5 you
could be forced to arbitrate against your will.
Consider the following hypothetical of Pat, Dan, and Tim. Pat and Dan enter into
an employment contract containing an arbitration clause. Tim, Pat’s archenemy,
convinces Dan that Pat will not be as good an employee and that Dan should hire
him instead. Dan then breaches his contract with Pat by firing him and hiring Tim.
Subsequently, Pat files a tort action against Tim alleging contractual interference. In
the ensuing litigation, Tim seeks to use the arbitration clause in Pat’s employment
contract to compel arbitration.
Under the equitable estoppel doctrine adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in MS
Dealer v. Franklin,6 Tim would probably be successful in obtaining a stay of the
litigation and compelling arbitration. In the hypothetical, Pat is a signatory7 litigant,
Tim is a non-signatory litigant, and Dan is a signatory non-litigant. Pat’s complaint
is based on a contract containing an arbitration clause, and he is alleging
interdependent and concerted misconduct between Tim and Dan (i.e., they conspired
together to breach Pat’s employment contract). Thus, although Tim was not a party
Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 (2002) (quoting DICTIONARY OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 28, 33 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999)).
2
See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers,
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1997); see also Jean R. Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.
Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea]; Nima H. Mohebbi, Note, Back Door
Arbitration: Why Allowing Nonsignatories to Unfairly Utilize Arbitration Clauses May
Violate the Seventh Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 555, 557 (2010).
3

See Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts:
A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1241-42 (2001).
4

See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency LLC, 210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2000); MS
Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999).
5
See, e.g., Liedtke v. Frank, 437 F. Supp. 2d 696 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Javitch v. First
Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2003).
6

MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947 (noting that equitable estoppel allowing a non-signatory to
compel arbitration arises when: (1) the signatory to a written agreement must rely on the terms
of the agreement in asserting her claims; and (2) when the signatory alleges substantially
interdependent and concerted misconduct between both the non-signatory and another of the
signatories).
7
This Note uses the term “signatory” to refer to a person who was an explicit party to a
contract containing an arbitration clause. In contrast, “non-signatory” will refer to a person
who was not a party to a contract containing an arbitration clause.
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to the original contract, he could still enforce the arbitration clause and compel
arbitration.
Of course, there is nothing especially unusual about allowing a third party to
enforce a contract.8 What is unusual about MS Dealer is that its equitable estoppel
analysis is not based on any traditional estoppel or contract theories.9 Nonetheless, as
the Supreme Court has noted with some frequency, arbitration is a matter of state
contract law.10 Further, the Court has provided some guidance on how courts should
analyze such situations when it held that a non-party to an arbitration agreement has
standing to compel arbitration “if the relevant state contract law allows him to
enforce the agreement.”11
This Note will argue that the Sixth Circuit should overrule its decision in Javitch
v. First Union and only allow a non-signatory to compel arbitration under an
equitable estoppel theory when the relevant state estoppel law is satisfied. As such,
Part I will provide an historical overview of arbitration law. Part II will survey the
case law that developed around MS Dealer and the equitable estoppel doctrine in
general. Part III will study the Sixth Circuit states’ application of equitable estoppel.
And Part IV will examine how MS Dealer and Javitch’s equitable estoppel doctrine
does not satisfy state estoppel laws.
I. THE ORIGINS OF ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA
Prior to the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925,12 American
courts, following English jurisprudence, refused to enforce arbitration agreements.13
Judicial hostility to arbitration agreements ultimately gave rise to the passage of the
FAA.14 This fact is crucial to understanding both the federal pro-arbitration policy
and the current preference of many courts for arbitration instead of litigation—even
when maintaining that preference may be inequitable.

8

The most common methods for allowing a non-party to enforce a contract include
agency law, third-party-beneficiary principles, and equitable estoppel. MS Dealer, 177 F. 3d at
947; see also Frank Z. LaForge, Note, Inequitable Estoppel: Arbitrating with Nonsignatory
Defendants Under Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEX. L. REV. 225, 230 (2005) (discussing
these principles).
9

See infra Part III & IV; see also LaForge, supra note 8, at 240.

10

See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009); EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
944 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987).
11

Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 632.

12

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).

13

Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 2, at 644 (noting that parties could agree to arbitrate
only after a dispute arose—not before).
14

Id. at 645-46.
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A. Brief History of European and English Arbitration
The collapse of the Roman Empire completely halted commercial activity in
Europe.15 Subsequently, a decentralized system of regional interaction, particularly
with respect to trade, developed.16 Agricultural improvements in the eleventh
century, however, enabled societies to sustain growing populations.17 As a result,
population boomed and people began migrating to urban areas, where a new class of
merchants emerged.18 In order to facilitate trade, these merchants, who traded with
other merchants living in distant cities,19 developed the law merchant, an informal
body of law that reflected the merchants’ customs and shared legal notions.20 When
disputes arose, merchants utilized private arbitrators rather than common-law judges
because “arbitrators were merchants who had expertise in the relevant trade and
were familiar with business norms and industry practices.”21
For centuries, arbitration remained the primary method for resolving commercial
disputes.22 Common-law judges in England, however, eventually became concerned
that arbitration served as an end run around the legal system and that arbitration
would weaken the English courts.23 Accordingly, English judges became hostile to
arbitration clauses and refused to enforce them in contracts.24 This policy enabled a
party to revoke, up until the arbitrator made her decision, her agreement to submit
15

See JAMES W. ERMATINGER, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 68 (2004)
(chronicling the history of the Roman Empire’s collapse and its effect on increased regional
interaction).
16

Id.

17
See Peter T. Leeson, One More Time With Feeling: The Law Merchant, Arbitration,
and International Trade, 2007 INDIAN J. OF ECON. & BUS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 29, 30 (discussing
development of merchant classes that followed from increased agricultural production and
urban migration).
18

Id.

19

Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV.
449, 460 (1996). Instead of becoming traveling salespersons, though, merchants organized
“fairs” where they met and engaged in trade with one another. Id.
20

Leeson, supra note 17, at 30.

21

Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous
Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and A Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 793
(2002); see also Cole, supra note 19, at 459 (examining a merchant’s understanding of the
common-law system).
22

Cole, supra note 19, at 461.

23

Id. (“Eventually, however, common law judges became concerned that the merchants’
ability to systematically circumvent common law court procedures by agreeing to submit their
disputes to arbitration had resulted in a reduction of the judges’ salaries.”) (citing Kill v.
Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 352, 1 Wils. 129 (1746)).
24

Id. at 462. Professor Cole suggests that the judges’ self-interested rationale “was that
the increased use of arbitration had diminished judges’ salaries because the amount a judge
was paid depended on the number of cases he heard.” Id. at 461-62 (citing Scott v. Avery, 25
L.J. Ex. 308, 313, 111 Rev. Rep. 392 (H.L. 1856)).
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the controversy to arbitration.25 This became known as the doctrine of revocability26
and remained the law in England for nearly 300 years.27 Finally, in 1889, the English
Parliament sounded the death knell for the revocability doctrine with the enactment
of the Arbitration Act.28 This change in English law is said to have prompted the
movement in the United States to reform arbitration law.29 Whatever ultimately
prompted the change in American arbitration law, it was clear that change would
have to come via the legislature, as in England, because the American judiciary
proved unwilling to make such a dramatic change in the law.30
B. A Brief Overview of American Arbitration Prior to the FAA
For the most part, the development of arbitration in America was influenced by
the English common-law tradition.31 Indeed, American courts used a variety of
rationales, some borrowed from the English common law, to refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements.32 Even in the early part of the twentieth century, many states
25
Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the
Appropriateness of Arbitration As A Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 426
(1998). This, of course, led to abuse; a party would revoke her submission to arbitrate if she
believed the arbitrator was going to rule against her. Id. at 426 n.188 (citing Bills to Make
Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements For Arbitration of Disputes Arising
Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions or Commerce Among the States or Territories or
with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the
Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924) (statement of Julius Henry
Cohen, Member of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the
American Bar Association and General Counsel for the New York State Chamber of
Commerce)).
26

See Vynior’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 80a , 81b (1609) (establishing the doctrine).

27

Harding, supra note 25, at 429.

28

IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 27 (1992); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23,
§§ 1-110 (Eng.).
29

MACNEIL, supra note 28, at 27.

30
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (“The courts have felt that the precedent was
too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have
frequently criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results
from it.”); see also U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006
(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (criticizing the doctrine of revocability, but nonetheless declining to enforce
an arbitration agreement).
31
See Pittman, supra note 21, at 797; see also Harding, supra note 25, at 426 (1998). At
least one commentator, however, notes that American courts were even more hostile toward
arbitration than their English counterparts. Cole, supra note 19, at 464 n.68.
32
See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (“agreements [made]
in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void”); Tobey
v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (“[Arbitrators] are not
ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity, to administer either
effectually, in complicated cases; and hence it has often been said, that the judgment of
arbitrators is but rusticum judicium”); Wood v. Humphrey, 114 Mass. 185, 186 (1873) (“It has
been long settled that agreements to arbitrate which entirely oust the courts of jurisdiction will
not be supported at law or in equity”).
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continued to pass laws that limited the scope of arbitration agreements—in spite of
the commercial desire and need for laws enforcing arbitration agreements.33
Nevertheless, businessmen increasingly turned to arbitration as government
regulation of the economy increased during the Progressive Era.34 These
businessmen found respite from government regulation by arbitrating their disputes
to solve their own problems “without resort to the clumsy and heavy hand of
[g]overnment.”35 Unlike judges or juries, “arbitrators confine themselves to their
specialty, that of passing on technical questions of fact in modern business.”36 This
proved crucial in increasing the desirability of arbitration as the complexities of new
business disputes led to an overtaxed judiciary whose procedures were inflexible and
whose laws tended to be obsolete.37
Lobbying efforts ramped up during the 1910s to change American arbitration law
and ensure that arbitration agreements would be enforced.38 New York became the
first state to codify a statute guaranteeing that courts would specifically enforce
arbitration agreements.39 Julius Henry Cohen, a leading proponent of the New York
law, argued that a legally enforceable arbitration clause demonstrated New York’s
public policy “toward adjusting trade difficulties out of court and thus preserving the
good relations between the parties, while securing a fair and reasonable adjustment
of the controversy in hand.”40 With businessmen and lawyers side by side, the effort
to end judicial hostility to arbitration and place such agreements on the “same
footing as other contracts”41 could not fail. In 1925, Congress passed the FAA,
which made arbitration agreements irrevocable and enforceable.42
C. The FAA and the Federal Presumption Toward Arbitration
The background provided above is critical to understanding the climate in which
the FAA was passed and how courts interpreted and understood the FAA
subsequently.43 After espousing such hostility toward arbitration agreements, courts,
33

Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 595
(1928). Sayre’s article, somewhat ironically, pleads that Congress should look to English law
and its arbitration reforms to address commercial concerns. See id. at 596.
34

JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 101 (1983).

35

Id.

36

Sayre, supra note 33, at 615.

37

Cole, supra note 19, at 465.

38

MACNEIL, supra note 28, at 28-29.

39

FRANCES A. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS
ACHIEVEMENTS 10 (1948).

AND

40
Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31
YALE L.J. 147, 152 (1921) (noting as well the statute’s “efficacy as a preventive of
unnecessary and burdensome litigation is as demonstrable as that sanitation is a preventive of
disease.”).
41

H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).

42

Cole, supra note 19, at 466.

43

Another point of emphasis is that the FAA was passed when Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), was still good law. Because the rules governing arbitration were considered
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in the wake of the FAA, found that it “establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language
itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”44
1. Current Law Regarding Arbitration Agreements
Today, whether or not a particular matter is subject to arbitration is a matter of
contract law.45 Thus, the key question in determining the enforceability of an
arbitration clause is whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the issue or
dispute.46 Even in light of the federal presumption to arbitrate, courts will not
enforce an arbitration clause that goes beyond the plain meaning or intent of the
parties just to satisfy the policy of favoring arbitration.47 “Arbitration under the
[FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion.”48
The federal presumption favoring arbitration continued to expand as the Supreme
Court interpreted the FAA to preempt state laws at variance with the FAA.49 Thus,
even if the parties file an action in state court to enforce an arbitration agreement, the
state court must apply the FAA if it is implicated.50 Still, ordinary state-law
procedural rather than substantive, federal courts sitting in diversity would not apply state
arbitration statutes, thus creating an additional need for a federal statute. Christopher R.
Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 126 (2002).
44

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); see
also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (“it has
been established that where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption
of arbitrability”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 583 (1960) (“Doubts should be resolved in favor of [arbitration].”).
45

First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).

46

See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (“we look first to whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy goals, to determine the scope of
the agreement”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12
(1967) (“the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable
as other contracts, but not more so”).
47

Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.

48

Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989).
49
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984); cf. Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing
Around Erie: The Emergence of a Federal General Common Law of Arbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 197, 199 (2006) (discussing the alternative interpretations offered by Southland’s
critics as well as its supporters). Although state law is utilized to determine whether the parties
actually agreed to arbitrate, there is now a body of federal substantive law regarding almost
every other aspect of arbitration. Id. at 202 (citing Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Moishe’s Elecs.,
Inc., 828 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). As one commenter notes, “for all practical purposes,
state law has been ousted from the arbitration arena by coupling the FAA with the Commerce
Clause.” Id. at 202.
50
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15. But see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 286-88 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress, when it passed the
FAA, did not consider it to be applicable in state courts due to the fact that Swift v. Tyson was
still good law); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration,
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principles regarding contract formation are used to decide whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate a given issue.51 Indeed, section 2 of the FAA prescribes that written
arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”52 Thus, the
FAA does not displace state law—either common law or statutory law—that applies
to all contracts; rather, the FAA precludes “the States from singling out arbitration
provisions for suspect status.”53
2. The Supreme Court and Equitable Estoppel
In 2009, the Supreme Court issued an opinion captioned Arthur Andersen LLP v.
Carlisle, which confirmed the primacy of state contract law in assessing agreements
to arbitrate.54 After they sold their construction-equipment company, Wayne
Carlisle, James Bushman, and Gary Strassel (“plaintiffs”) were introduced to
Bricolage Capital as well as several law firms by their auditor Arthur Andersen.55 On
the advice of these advisors, the plaintiffs engaged in a complicated tax shelter plan
designed to create illusory losses.56 As part of this plan, plaintiffs formed several
limited liability companies, which subsequently entered into investment
management agreements with Bricolage.57 These agreements contained an
arbitration clause.58
“As with all that seems too good to be true, a controversy did indeed arise.”59
The investments the plaintiffs made were worthless, and the IRS found the tax
shelter to be illegal.60 The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the defendants,
Bricolage Capital and Arthur Anderson, alleging fraud (among other claims).61 The
defendants62 moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration under an equitable
56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233, 249 (2008) (arguing that the FAA “was meant to merely serve as a
gap-filler in a system in which the assertion of judicial jurisdiction was controlled by Swift v.
Tyson”).
51
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (citing Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-63, n.9 (1995), Volt Info., 489 U.S. at 475-76,
and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987)).
52

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added).

53

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Sherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (noting that arbitration clauses are
indistinguishable from contracts).
54

Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009).

55

Id. at 626.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 627.

62

Barring Bricolage, which filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 627 n.2.
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estoppel argument.63 The district court rejected this argument and denied their stay.64
Subsequently, the defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which held that because
the arbitration agreement was not in writing, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.65
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address how federal courts should
interpret equitable estoppel in the context of an agreement to arbitrate,66 it confirmed
some background principles, and its dicta suggests that federal courts turn to state
law when confronted with a non-signatory seeking to compel arbitration.67 Indeed,
the Court was quite explicit that the FAA does not alter any state contract laws
regarding the scope of agreements, “including the question of who is bound by
them.”68 Thus, it was error for the Sixth Circuit to hold that non-signatories are, by
definition, barred from § 3 relief; that question must be answered with reference to
state law.69 The Court was explicit that when the lower courts are confronted with a
non-signatory seeking to enforce an arbitration clause, the courts must look to state
contract law to determine if the non-signatory can compel arbitration.70

63

Id. at 627.

64

Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 598 (6th Cir.
2008), rev’d sub nom. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009).
65

Id. Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA permits that, “[a]n appeal may be taken from an order
refusing a stay of any action under section 3.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1) (2012). Section 3 prescribes
that a federal court shall issue a stay of the litigation if the issue is “referable to arbitration
under an agreement made in writing for such arbitration.” Id. § 3 (emphasis added). The Sixth
Circuit “read the plain language” of the FAA to “preclude appellate jurisdiction” because
there was not an agreement in writing between the parties; there were agreements in writing
between defendants and the limited liability companies, but not between the plaintiffs or
defendants. Carlisle, 521 F.3d at 602; see also In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practice
Litig. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P., 428 F.3d 940, 944-45 (10th Cir. 2005); DSMC Inc. v.
Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (both agreeing with the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit). But see Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) (disagreeing with
the Sixth Circuit and holding that the claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the
arbitration clause, which meets the writing requirement of the FAA).
66

The issues before the Court were “whether appellate courts have jurisdiction under §
16(a) [of the FAA] to review denials of stays requested by litigants who were not parties to the
relevant arbitration agreement, and whether § 3 can ever mandate a stay in such
circumstances.” Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 625-26. The Court held that a non-signatory
could invoke § 3 “if the relevant state contract law allows him to enforce the agreement.” Id.
at 632.
67
See id. But see Mohebbi, supra note 2, at 568 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion vastly expands the scope of the FAA).
68

Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 630.

69

Id. at 631 (citing 21 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACT § 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed. 2001)).

70

Id. But see id. at 633 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that FAA should be read to offer a
§ 3 stay only to signatories of the contract); see also Mohebbi, supra note 2, at 568.
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II. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Given that a valid contract requires mutual consent, a non-signatory cannot, as a
general rule, compel a signatory to arbitrate.71 Nevertheless, courts have recognized
that non-signatories may be bound to an arbitration agreement under ordinary
contract and agency law principles.72 The Sixth Circuit has recognized five theories
for binding the non-signatory: (1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3)
agency, (4) veil-piercing/alter ego, and (5) equitable estoppel.73 This article will
focus on the equitable estoppel theory and examine how courts have used this theory
to compel arbitration between parties who never actually agreed to arbitrate.
A. MS Dealer v. Franklin
In MS Dealer v. Franklin, the plaintiff, Sharon Franklin, entered into a contract
to purchase a car from the defendant-car dealership.74 The contract also included a
third-party service contract with MS Dealer, a non-signatory to the underlying
agreement.75 The plaintiff sued both MS Dealer and the auto dealership after she
discovered several defects in the car; she alleged fraud, breach of contract,
conspiracy, and breach of warranty.76 MS Dealer sought to use the arbitration clause
contained in the contract77 to compel arbitration. Even though MS Dealer was not a
signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause, the Eleventh Circuit held
that MS Dealer could compel arbitration under an equitable estoppel theory.78 In
71
See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (“[A]
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit.”) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582 (1960)).
72

See Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1281 (6th Cir. 1990).

73

Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing ThomsonCSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995)).
74

MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 944 (11th Cir. 1999).

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

The arbitration provision provided: “BUYER HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES AND
AGREES THAT ALL DISPUTES AND CONTROVERSIES OF EVERY KIND AND
NATURE BETWEEN BUYER AND JIM BURKE MOTORS, INC. ARISING OUT OF OR
IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OF THIS VEHICLE WILL BE RESOLVED
BY ARBITRATION.” Id.
78

Id. Courts often note a distinction between a non-signatory seeking to compel
arbitration against a signatory and a signatory seeking to compel arbitration against a nonsignatory. See Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779 (noting that courts will estop a signatory from
avoiding arbitration but will not estop a non-signatory from avoiding arbitration when the
benefit being sought on the contract is only indirect). The Thomson court justified the
distinction by arguing that when a non-signatory compels a signatory, the signatory has
indicated a willingness to arbitrate—albeit not with the party compelling arbitration. Id. Since
arbitration, however, is based on the consent of the parties—something the Thomson court
concedes—the distinction is meaningless; if the parties did not agree to arbitrate with one
another, then arbitration can never be compelled—unless some other contract theory demands
it.
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doing so, the court delineated two different circumstances where existing case law
allowed a non-signatory to compel arbitration using equitable estoppel: (1) when the
signatory to a written contract with an arbitration clause must rely on the terms of
contract in asserting her claims against the non-signatory;79 and (2) when the
signatory raises allegations of “substantially interdependent and concerted
misconduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories.”80
The MS Dealer court held that both circumstances applied and compelled
arbitration.81 Although the plaintiff did not allege that the service contract had been
violated in any way, each of her fraud and conspiracy claims depended entirely on
her contractual obligations.82 The second circumstance was met because the plaintiff
alleged that MS Dealer and the auto dealership engaged in a fraudulent scheme
together.83 After holding the plaintiff equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration,
the court did not determine whether MS Dealer could compel arbitration under either
an agency or third-party beneficiary theory.84
The Eleventh Circuit later recognized that MS Dealer was abrogated by Arthur
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle by noting that, “state law governs whether an arbitration
clause is enforceable against a nonsignatory under the FAA.”85 Nevertheless, the
court compelled arbitration against a non-signatory because the non-signatory’s
claim was “inextricably intertwined” with his claims against the signatory.86
Although this analysis is probably insufficient under most state estoppel laws,87 the
court justified its holding by citing to a Florida state court that adopted MS Dealer’s
equitable estoppel analysis.88 Thus, the court recognized the abrogation yet still

79

MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947 (citing Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.
10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir. 1993)).
80
Id. (quoting Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc. 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1433 (M.D. Ala.
1997)). These two “circumstances” eventually became two prongs of one test. See, e.g., In re
Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971, 975 (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom., PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
81

MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947.

82

Id. at 948. The court noted that although the plaintiff attempted to sound her complaint
against MS Dealer in tort (i.e., fraud and conspiracy), those claims depended entirely upon her
contractual obligation to pay for the service contract. Id. at 948 n.4.
83
Id. But cf. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 535 (5th Cir. 2000)
(Dennis, dissenting) (arguing that the contract was ambiguous and it would not be
unreasonable to construe it to include MS Dealer as one of the parties to it, thus obviating the
need to resort to an equitable estoppel theory to compel arbitration).
84

MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 948.

85

Escobal v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 482 F. App’x 475, 476 (11th Cir. 2012).

86

Id.

87

See infra Parts III & IV; see also In re Standard Jury Instructions—Contract & Bus.
Cases, 116 So. 3d 284, 328 (Fla. 2013) (providing that equitable estoppel is established when
a party took action, which another party relied on in good faith to her detriment); Major
League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001) (an estoppel arises where a
party “willfully cause[s] another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and
thereby induces him to act on this belief injuriously to himself.”).
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followed MS Dealer’s reasoning because it found that MS Dealer was incorporated
into Florida’s contract law.89
B. Javitch v. First Union Securities, Inc.
The Sixth Circuit continued to demonstrate the federal policy favoring arbitration
when it vacated the district court’s denial of a signatory’s motion to compel
arbitration against a non-signatory in Javitch v. First Union Securities, Inc.90 The
plaintiff, Victor Javitch, was appointed as receiver for VES and CFL91 to oversee
and administer their business and assets for the benefit of all their creditors,
investors, and owners.92 Under this authority, Javitch brought claims against First
Union Securities, Charles Schwab, Fifth Third, and several of each firm’s individual
brokers.93 Each complaint averred negligence, negligent supervision, breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, conspiracy to defraud, RICO violations, aiding and abetting
violations of federal securities laws, and conversion.94 Each defendant sought to
compel arbitration because VES and CFL, when they opened brokerage accounts at
the defendant-firms, entered into binding arbitration agreements as part of the
customary consumer contract.95
The defendants argued that even though Javitch, as the receiver, did not enter
into an arbitration agreement, he should nevertheless be compelled to arbitrate
because the broker-customer relationship on which he based his claims would not
exist but for the agreements containing the arbitration clause.96 This is thus an
inverse of the MS Dealer scenario, where a non-signatory defendant attempts to
compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate; in Javitch, signatory defendants sought to
compel a non-signatory plaintiff to arbitrate. As such, the court used the Second
Circuit’s equitable estoppel analysis in Thomson-CSF v. American Arbitration
Association, which held that a non-signatory could only be compelled to arbitrate
when she “seeks a direct benefit from the contract while disavowing the arbitration

88
Escobal, 482 F. App’x at 476 n.3 (citing Kolsky v. Jackson Square, LLC, 28 So. 3d
965, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).
89
However, this is circular logic. The Eleventh Circuit realized that Supreme Court
precedent foreclosed complete reliance on MS Dealer, unless it was based on state contract
law. But the Eleventh Circuit still applied MS Dealer because a Florida state court relied on its
reasoning before the Eleventh Circuit realized that MS Dealer was abrogated.
90

315 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2003).

91

Javitch was judicially appointed after it was alleged, in a separate case, that James
Capwill and entities he controlled, including VES and CFL, defrauded funding companies and
investors. Id. at 621.
92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 622.

95

Id. at 623.

96

Id. at 628-29. The court noted that each claim rested on the duties defendants owed
VES and CFL. Id. at 622.
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provision.”97 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
further fact finding on whether Javitch sought a direct benefit from the customer
agreements.98
On remand, the district court stayed the litigation in favor of arbitration under an
equitable estoppel theory.99 The district court specifically noted that Javitch “cannot
both seek to benefit in this suit from the relationships created by those agreements,
while disavowing the arbitration provisions.”100
The Sixth Circuit has yet to address the equitable estoppel scenario raised in MS
Dealer and several other prominent cases,101 but the district courts within the circuit
have seen and decided these issues. For example, in Cox v. ScreeningOne, Inc.,102
Wise v. Zwicker & Associates, PC,103 Villanueva v. Barcroft,104 Simpson v. LifeNet,
Inc.,105 Eaves-Leanos v. Assurant, Inc.,106 and Liedtke v. Frank,107 the district courts
adopted the equitable estoppel analysis of MS Dealer. Thus, a question arises as to
whether MS Dealer’s equitable estoppel is recognized by state contract laws within
the Sixth Circuit.
III. SIXTH CIRCUIT STATE LAW ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
As seen above, agreements to arbitrate are interpreted in light of state-law
contract principles.108 Although the FAA and its subsequent case law created a body
of federal substantive law governing arbitrability (i.e., whether a given dispute or
97

Id. at 778-79. When only an indirect benefit is sought, the non-signatory may not be
compelled to arbitrate; if a signatory sought only an indirect benefit, she, of course, could be
compelled to arbitrate (assuming the requirements of MS Dealer are met). Id.
98
Javitch, 315 F.3d at 629. This direct versus indirect benefit analysis seems similar to
the first prong of MS Dealer, requiring that signatory rely on the terms of a written contract
when asserting her claims. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir.
1999); see also Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen, 206 F.3d 411, 418
(4th Cir. 2000) (“[A] party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a
written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause when he has
consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to
benefit him”).
99
Javitch v. First Union Sec., No. 3:01 CV 780, 2011 WL 665727, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb.
15, 2011).
100

Id.

101
For a detailed analysis of one particularly eccentric case, which has, as its author notes,
“it all: rags-to-riches Hollywood success stories, celebrity superstars, chainsaw massacres,
duplicitous movie executives,” and equitable estoppel, see LaForge, supra note 8, at 233.
102

No. 4:14-CV-229, 2015 WL 413812, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2015).

103

No. 5:12-CV-01653, 2013 WL 1195555, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013).

104

822 F. Supp. 2d 726, 739 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (applying MS Dealer in the context of a
forum selection clause).
105

No. 09-12228-BC, 2010 WL 86328, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2010).

106

No. 3:07-CV-18-S, 2008 WL 1805394, at *2-3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 21, 2008).

107

437 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699 (N.D. Ohio 2006).

108

First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
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contract is subject to arbitration), state law is used to determine whether or not the
parties agreed to arbitrate.109 The following section examines the state of equitable
estoppel in each state within the Sixth Circuit and analyzes whether such laws are
consistent with the approach adopted by courts within the Sixth Circuit.
A. Kentucky
In Kentucky,
The essential elements of equitable estoppel are[:] (1) conduct which
amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at
least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such
conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other
persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. And,
broadly speaking, as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the
essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good
faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3)
action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the
position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury,
detriment, or prejudice.110
In Sebastian, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not
equitably estop a zoning board from denying his zoning plan—even though it had a
long history of prior approvals.111 Indeed, the slow pace of development, over a fourdecade stretch, showed that the plaintiff’s actions (or inactions) were directly related
to the slow pace of development—not the actions of the board; his actions were not
induced by any reliance on a representation made by the zoning board.112 Further,
the long delay created a foreseeable possibility that not only zoning regulations
might change, but also the attitude of the zoning board.113 The crux of this holding is
that a plaintiff must innocently rely to her detriment on some false representation.
B. Michigan
Michigan requires that one who seeks to invoke equitable estoppel must establish
that there has been: “(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2)
an expectation that the other party will rely on the misconduct, and (3) knowledge of
109

Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Moishe’s Elecs., Inc. 828 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The
notion that there is a body of federal common law regarding arbitration is highly controversial,
with critics claiming that this violates the Erie Doctrine. Dunham, supra note 49, at 199
(summarizing the arguments of both critics and supporters).
110

Sebastian-Voor Properties, LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 265 S.W.3d
190, 194-95 (Ky. 2008); see also Weiand v. Bd. of Trs. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 25 S.W.3d 88, 91
(Ky. 2000); Elec. & Water Plant Bd. of Frankfort v. Suburban Acres Dev., Inc., 513 S.W.2d
489, 491 (Ky. 1974).
111

Sebastian, 265 S.W.3d at 194.

112

Id.

113

Id.
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the actual facts on the part of the representing or concealing party.”114 Although
Michigan courts utilize their equitable powers, such powers are reserved for
extraordinary circumstances.115 Indeed, Michigan’s Supreme Court has been
unwilling to find an estoppel unless there has been intentional or negligent
conduct.116
In Cincinnati Insurance, Michigan’s Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to estop
the defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.117 In a
subrogation dispute between two insurance agencies, the court found that the
plaintiff delayed bringing litigation “at the request of [the defendant].”118 This fact,
coupled with ample evidence showing that the defendant represented that the
subrogation claim would be processed quickly, justified the plaintiff in relying on
the defendant’s representations.119 Similar to Kentucky’s equitable estoppel,
Michigan essentially requires that a party make a misrepresentation, on which the
other party detrimentally relies.
C. Ohio
The principle that underscores Ohio’s gloss on equitable estoppel “is to prevent
actual or constructive fraud and to promote the ends of justice.”120 Similar to
Kentucky and Michigan, Ohio bases its doctrine on detrimental reliance.121 An
estoppel arises where one has been innocently misled into an injurious position,122 or
where one party induces another to believe certain things and the other party
reasonably relies on the misrepresentation to her detriment.123
In Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, the court found that the defendants could
not be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the
plaintiff’s claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and breach of fiduciary
duty (among others).124 The plaintiff alleged that she had a sexual relationship,
114

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Mich. 1997).

115

Flynn v. Korneffel, 547 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. 1996).

116

Cincinnati Ins., 562 N.W.2d at 651 (citing Lothian v. Detroit, 324 N.W.2d 9 (Mich.
1982)); see also Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 702 N.W.2d 539, n.64 (Mich. 2005); Solo
v. Chrysler Corp., 292 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. 1980).
117

Cincinnati Ins., 562 N.W.2d at 652.

118

Id. at 651.

119
Id. at 652. The court further notes, ipso facto, the fact that the defendant “did not intend
to honor its representations is demonstrated by the fact that it did not honor them.” Id.
120

Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 555 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ohio 1990).

121

Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 880 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ohio 2008) (quoting
McAfferty v. Conover’s Lessee, 7 Ohio St. 99, 105 (1857) (“[A] party will be concluded from
denying his own acts or admissions, which were designed to influence the conduct of another,
and did so influence, and when such denial will operate to the injury of the latter”)).
122

Russell v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 131 N.E. 726, 733 (Ohio 1921).

123

State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. 641 N.E.2d 188, 193
(Ohio 1994).
124

Doe, 880 N.E.2d at 893.
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which gave rise to her claims, with a priest some forty years prior to the litigation.125
She further alleged that the priest and a nurse persuaded her that she must “suffer in
silence.”126 Nevertheless, the court held that the only facts relevant to her equitable
estoppel argument would be any allegations that the Archdiocese tried to prevent her
from timely filing suit.127 Indeed, the court reaffirmed that the purpose of equitable
estoppel is to prevent fraud, and here, none of the plaintiff’s allegations provided any
indication that the plaintiff was duped into not filing suit.128 A common thread
linking these states together is the requirement that the party seeking an estoppel
must detrimentally rely on a statement or misrepresentation of the other party.
D. Tennessee
According to Tennessee, equitable estoppel arose from the maxim that no person
may take advantage of her own wrong.129 To assert a viable equitable estoppel
argument, a party must establish that she was induced to follow an injurious course
by her opponent, who knew, or reasonably should have known, that such
inducements would cause injury.130 Importantly, this doctrine only applies where
“the opposing party ha[s] engaged in misconduct.”131 Accordingly, each Sixth
Circuit state requires some form of misconduct and detrimental reliance on that
misconduct. The next section examines whether the equitable estoppel theories
espoused by MS Dealer and Javitch have any root in the traditional state-law
estoppel doctrines.
IV. INEQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
A. The Inequities of MS Dealer
The most obvious problem with MS Dealer’s equitable estoppel argument is that
the parties never agreed to arbitrate their dispute. Indeed, the focus is on esoteric
interpretations of the signatory’s claims—rather than any theory of contractual
consent.132 Moreover, as discussed below, equity is not offended if a court refuses to
compel arbitration on behalf of a non-signatory against a signatory. Instead, it would
125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id. at 895.

128

Id.

129

Richardson v. Snipes, 330 S.W.2d 381, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959) (quoting 1 HENRY
R. GIBSON, GIBSON’S SUITS IN CHANCERY § 60 pg. 74 (5th ed. 1955)).
130
Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 460 (Tenn.
2012); see also Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 315-16
(Tenn. 2009) (listing the elements of equitable estoppel: (1) conduct that amounts to a false
representation, (2) intention that such conduct will be acted upon, and (3) knowledge of the
real facts).
131

Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tenn. 1995).

132

Again this consent does not have to be explicit. There are many vehicles, such as
agency law and third-party beneficiary principles, that are firmly footed in contract law that
may provide a method for compelling arbitration in the MS Dealer scenario. MS Dealer’s
equitable estoppel theory is not one of those vehicles.
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seem that equity would in fact demand the non-enforcement of the arbitration clause
because enforcing it effectively nullifies the signatory’s constitutional right to civil
court.133
As an initial matter, it is possible that MS Dealer’s first prong, requiring that
signatory must rely on the terms of the contract in asserting her claims against the
non-signatory,134 could comply with traditional estoppel theories in that by asserting
a claim against a non-signatory, the signatory is making an implicit
misrepresentation.135 In essence, the first prong requires the signatory to make
contradictory statements/claims; she is attempting to hold the non-signatory liable
based on the terms of the contract while denying or ignoring the arbitration clause
contained therein.136 This, however, seems to misunderstand the purpose behind
equitable estoppel: preventing wrongdoers from profiting from their wrongdoing.137
The focus should be on the wrongful or fraudulent conduct of a party, upon which
equity prevents that party from profiting;138 under MS Dealer, the focus is on the
abstract interpretations of the signatory’s claims (i.e., whether or not the claims are
inextricably intertwined with the contract)—not the signatory’s conduct toward the
non-signatory.139
The crux of this is that MS Dealer’s first prong requires a court to focus on the
claims of the signatory—not her conduct. As an example, consider the facts of MS
Dealer itself.140 Recall that the first prong was met because the plaintiff’s claims
made reference to and assumed the existence of a written contract.141 But there is
nothing about her conduct that might give rise to an estoppel. Indeed, courts
generally require that some representation be made.142 Almost by definition, then,
there must be some contact or conduct between the parties. MS Dealer, however,
focuses solely upon claim construction and interpretation—not the conduct of the
133

See sources cited supra note 2. Professor Sternlight has been one the chief critics
against binding arbitration—especially in so far as it infringes on a litigant’s Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.
134

MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999).

135

See Mohebbi, supra note 2, at 574.

136

See LaForge, supra note 8, at 244.

137

See, e.g., Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 555 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ohio 1990);
Richardson v. Snipes, 330 S.W.2d 381, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959) (quoting GIBSON, supra
note 129, at § 60 pg. 74).
138

See David K. Thompson, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
551, 551 (1979).
139

LaForge, supra note 8, at 241.

140

See supra Part II.A.

141

MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999).

142

See, e.g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 935 (1986) (“An essential element of any
estoppel is detrimental reliance on the adverse party's misrepresentations”); WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 8:3 (4th ed.) (“[I]t is generally held that a representation of past or existing fact
made to a party who relies upon it reasonably may not thereafter be denied by the party
making the representation if permitting the denial would result in injury or damage to the
party who so relies.”).
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parties. Indeed, the facts of MS Dealer are unclear as to what, if any, relationship the
parties had with one another because the court was not concerned with any contact
the two may have had prior to the filing of the claim.143 But surely there cannot be a
contractual relationship absent any interaction.
The second prong of MS Dealer, which requires a signatory’s claims raise
allegations of “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the
non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract”),144 is equally
problematic in its distortion of equitable estoppel. As one commentator argues, the
second prong “contains no requirement that the action against the nonsignatory relate
in any way to the agreement containing the arbitration provision, instead allowing
the nonsignatory to take advantage of the provision if it makes allegations of
‘substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct.’”145 Indeed, the second
prong is problematic for the opposite reason the first is problematic: this prong is all
about misconduct—but not the kind state law requires in equitable estoppel.146 In
this scenario, a court is rewarding the non-signatory wrongdoer who conspired with
a signatory to injure the putative plaintiff. Equity should, in fact, demand that the
opposite result be reached.
Although there are some nuances and differences between them, Sixth Circuit
states generally require two elements for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply:
(1) the estopped party makes some kind of misrepresentation; and (2) the other party
to have detrimentally relied on that misrepresentation.147 Even if both prongs of MS
Dealer are satisfied, there still would no estoppel because there is no relationship
between the parties that evinces any kind of detrimental reliance.148 If the parties
never interact, there can never be any misrepresentation on which the other party can
rely. Any interaction between the parties in these arbitration scenarios occurs only

143
It may well be true that compelling arbitration was the correct decision in MS Dealer.
But not on estoppel grounds. Indeed, one judge even argued that MS Dealer and the plaintiff
“actually manifested their mutual assent to a bargain in which they exchanged promises of
performance with each other.” Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 536
(5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, dissenting). However, the Eleventh Circuit, by holding that the
plaintiff was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration, refused to consider any other
theory of enforcing the arbitration clause. MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 948 (“[W]e need not
determine whether MS Dealer could enforce arbitration under an agency theory or a thirdparty-beneficiary theory.”).
144

MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947.

145
Christopher Driskill, Note, A Dangerous Doctrine: The Case Against Using ConcertedMisconduct Estoppel to Compel Arbitration, 60 ALA. L. REV. 443, 453 (2009).
146

Eventually the Eleventh Circuit required a party to satisfy both parts of the MS Dealer
test to permit a non-signatory from compelling arbitration, id. at 455 (discussing In re
Humana, Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002)), but many courts have
neglected to impose such a restraint, see Mohebbi, supra note 2, at 575 n.136 (discussing
those cases).
147

See supra Part III.

148

See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 880 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ohio 2008) (noting
that plaintiff never alleged to be in contact or to have been contacted by the defendants; thus
her equitable estoppel claim must fail because she failed to allege any misrepresentation).
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when the plaintiff files her claims. For example, in Liedtke v. Frank,149 the plaintiff
received a credit card from Household Bank; after she amassed debt on the card, the
bank hired a law firm to run a credit inquiry and collect the debt.150 The plaintiff
filed suit alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,151 and the defendant
law firm sought to compel arbitration under the plaintiff’s contract with the bank.152
The only interaction between the parties, and thus the only possible
misrepresentation, was when the plaintiff filed her claim in court. As a result, the
misrepresentation and the reliance occurred simultaneously, whereas traditional
estoppel law presumes a temporal element.153 This temporal element is essential
because without it there is no detrimental reliance.154
At its most basic level, equitable estoppel is about equity and fairness.155 The
crux of the argument against MS Dealer’s equitable estoppel is that it is inequitable.
The Eleventh Circuit focuses its analysis on only one of the parties’ claims or
conduct—rather than the traditional considerations of the conduct of both parties.156
Absent this kind of reciprocal relationship (of a misrepresentation followed by
detrimental reliance), it cannot be said that parties ever, either expressly or
impliedly, had an agreement to arbitrate.157 Without such an agreement, a court
cannot compel arbitration in light of Supreme Court precedent.158
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit and its courts should abandon any of their
equitable estoppel precedents that rely on MS Dealer because, in contravention of
Supreme Court precedent, these cases are not founded on or based on state law. Only
where a party can show, at a minimum, a misrepresentation followed by detrimental
reliance will an equitable estoppel arise.
B. The Inequities of Javitch
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit should apply the same equitable estoppel standard
when reviewing motions to compel arbitration under Javitch v. First Union. Even
though Javitch presents the inverse of MS Dealer (i.e., a signatory is attempting to
149

437 F. Supp. 2d 696 (N.D. Ohio 2006).

150

Id. at 697.

151

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012).

152

Liedtke, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 698.

153

LaForge, supra note 8, at 249.

154

Indeed, a party cannot assert that she detrimentally relied on another party’s
misrepresentation before the misrepresentation was made.
155

Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC. 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000).

156

If A represented to B that she would be getting the same contract as C, whose contract
contained an arbitration clause, it is only equitable that A be estopped from denying the
arbitration clause. B relied to her detriment on A’s representation that the contract would be
identical to C’s.
157

One of the frustrating things about the case law is that the courts never analyze how a
non-signatory could be held liable under the terms of the contract. See Grigson, 210 F.3d at
533 (Dennis, dissenting) (suggesting that in MS Dealer both the signatory and the nonsignatory actually manifested consent to arbitration); see also LaForge, supra note 8, at 252.
158

See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 280 (2002).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

19

1046

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1027

compel arbitration against a non-signatory),159 the same considerations apply: only
where there has been misrepresentation followed by detrimental reliance will
equitable estoppel apply. The court’s distinction160 between a non-signatory seeking
a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause and the same nonsignatory seeking an indirect benefit is inapposite to state estoppel laws. Once more,
the court is only addressing the conduct of one of the parties, ignoring state law
requiring a relationship between the conduct and the resulting harm.
As explained above, this focus on a party’s claims rather than her conduct
completely confuses the issues at hand. Indeed, this approach effectively confuses
the actual parties to the controversy by treating the case as one between two
signatories to the arbitration contract.161 By requiring that the non-signatory seek a
direct benefit from the contract, the court is, in essence, attempting to ascertain
whether the contract is implicated; the logic of this being the two signatories who
actually made the contract agreed to arbitrate all claims the arose under the
contract—regardless of whether the claims were being litigated by a signatory or a
non-signatory.162 The inevitable consequence of this logic would be to “bind both
parties to arbitrate their contract-related claims against the world-at-large, not just
each other.”163 Of course, as discussed above, arbitration is a matter of contract and
consent;164 two parties are free to contract away their right to civil court, but such an
agreement cannot, as a basic tenant of contract law, bind anyone outside of that
agreement.
Thus it is immaterial, as a matter of contract law, whether the benefit being
sought by the non-signatory plaintiff in regards to the contract is direct or indirect.
What matters is consent. Similarly, there is no indication in Javitch that the parties
ever interacted prior to the commencement of the lawsuit.165 As a result, there cannot
have been any sort of misrepresentation that might have given rise to an estoppel;
without a misrepresentation, it is impossible to have detrimental reliance.166 Even
though, the signatory defendants did agree to arbitrate issues that arose under the
contract, they did not agree with the non-signatory plaintiff.
To examine these principles, let us return to our hypothetical of Pat, Dan, and
Tim. Now, Dan sells a car to Tim; the sales contract contains an arbitration clause.
159

Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003).

160

This distinction is drawn from Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773,
776 (2d Cir. 1995).
161

LaForge, supra note 8, at 242-43.

162

This type of circular logic is most likely a result of the pro-arbitration dogma that
pervades federal courts.
163

Id. at 245.

164

See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009); EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
944 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987).
165

Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 628 (6th Cir. 2003). The defendants all
had contact or a relationship with the entities placed in receivership, but they did not have any
interaction with the receiver, Victor Javitch. Id. Again, there may be some other contractual
theory that might compel arbitration, but not equitable estoppel.
166

Or, at least, reasonable detrimental reliance.
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Subsequently, Dan sells another car to Pat and knowingly misleads Pat that his
contract contains an arbitration clause like Tim’s. If Dan subsequently instigates
litigation against Pat alleging breach of contract, Pat, under the state law estoppel
theories discussed above, may be successful in staying the litigation and compelling
arbitration—even though the parties did not mutually agree to arbitrate. But here,
equity would demand arbitration. Dan made a material misrepresentation that Pat
relied on to his detriment;167 Dan would thus be estopped from denying he
represented to Pat that Pat’s contract would have an arbitration clause.168
Importantly, the inverse of this hypothetical would not justify an estoppel; that is,
if Dan attempted to compel arbitration. After all, it was Dan who made the material
misrepresentation, and he should not be permitted to profit from his malfeasance. It
is only the party that detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation who can be
granted an estoppel. Thus it is immaterial what Dan’s claims are,169 all that matters is
that Dan made a misrepresentation upon which Pat detrimentally relied.
As such, the Sixth Circuit should overturn its decision in Javitch and treat the
inverse MS Dealer situation the same as any other equitable estoppel claim.
CONCLUSION
The federal policy favoring arbitration is strong, but even that strong policy does
not force parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to arbitrate.170 In order to
determine whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate, courts turn to ordinary state
contract law.171 State laws within the Sixth Circuit require, at a minimum, both a
misrepresentation and detrimental reliance for a party to assert an equitable estoppel
argument.172 Thus, Sixth Circuit case law at variance with this equitable estoppel
definition is both inequitable and at odds with Supreme Court precedent.

167

Note that this is a simplified hypothetical and that each state’s estoppel laws are more
nuanced and would need to be explored in greater depth to determine precisely when an
estoppel would lie.
168
As the Supreme Court has noted, “he who by his language or conduct leads another to
do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by
disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.” Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578,
580 (1879).
169
Not entirely, to be fair. Pat would only be entitled to an estoppel based upon the
misrepresentation. Thus he could not compel arbitration against any and all of Dan’s claims—
just the ones that would have been subject to arbitration if Dan had been truthful.
170

See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002).

171

Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009).

172

See supra Part III.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

21

1048

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/8

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1027

22

